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ARGUMENTI 
THE PROSECUTION HAD A DUTY TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH A LIST OF 
ALL ANTICIPATED WITNESSES PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
The trial court ruled that the testimony of Mr. Gonzales was admissable because there was 
no specific request for witnesses in the file. (Trial transcript, Page 66). The City does not address 
the propriety of the trial court's reasoning but instead concedes that the governing case is State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), and that the defense had no obligation to make a specific 
written request for witnesses. The issue thus turns on the factual issue as to whether the list of 
witnesses was in feet in the file, and whether this list was provided to defense counsel 
The City alleges in its Appellee Brief that Ms. Patton had free access to the file and plenty 
of opportunity to view the cover sheet with the list of witnesses that was allegedly stapled into the 
file (Appellee's Brie£ page 8). In feet, each time die went to the city attorney's office to view the 
file, she was shown only that portion of the file that was approved by the city attorney prior to her 
viewing the file. The file as it was presented to Ms. Patton did not contain any witness Hst. Ms. 
Patton requested a copy of the file, and this was promptly done, but the copy of the file provided 
by the City to Ms. Patton contained no witness list. At the same time, based on the City's 
representations, Ms. Patton had no reason whatsoever to suspect that she had received anything 
less than the complete file. This, of course, is precisely the situation set forth in Salt Lake City v. 
Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993), as cited in Appellant's Brief on page 8. In that 
case as in this, the city failed to completely respond to the defendant's discovery request, but also 
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foiled to inform the defense that it was refusing to provide all requested information. The defense 
did not attempt to compel discovery because the prosecution's conduct had misled them to 
believe they had no reason to do so. 
This same principal appHes as to the City's subsequent argument (Appellee's Brie£ page 
9) that Ms. Patton had been provided with a copy of the memo indicating that Mr. Malloy had 
been accompanied by Mr. Gonzales. As noted in the Appellant's Brief on page 9, this 
memorandum stated that Mr. Malloy, not Mr. Gonzales, took the relevant photographs. And as 
already noted there, the response of both Mr. Malloy and Mr. McGinn to the direct question at 
pretrial of both Mrs. Patton and Mr.Humiston as to who the city's witnesses would be was very 
clear that Mr. Malloy would be the only witness. It is hard to imagine a more direct 
misrepresentation by the City. There can thus be no question that the City foiled in its duty to 
provide full discovery and not to mislead the defense. This is precisely the situation set forth in 
State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), where the prosecution foiled to provide the 
defense with all information available, and foiled to inform the defense that it had produced less 
than the full file. Provo City has foiled in any way to distinguish that case from this one. 
ARGUMENT H 
THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN ADMITTING GONZALES' SURPRISE TESTIMONY 
SO PREJUDICED DEFENDANT'S CASE AS TO UNDERMINE ALL CONFIDENCE IN 
THE VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL AND WARRANTS REVERSAL. 
The case law makes clear that the court erred in allowing the testimony of Mr. Gonzales. 
-2-
1 . S of the Utah Rules df Fvidenec states: 
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they 
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own 
motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person. 
(2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its 
representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be 
essential to the presentation of his cause. 
Had Ms. Pa t tonhad any idea thai tiie City intended to tall any witness nilin tlwii Mi 
Malloy, she would have invoked the exclusion of witnesses under this rule, as sh^ L~~ ~
 JM, done 
in previous cases. "The purpose of the rule is to prevent witnesses from 'tailoring' their testimony 
In lliiill nl nail liu i\i((i( sa s .in Il II iii iiiiiiill in in in i l i II * 1 II mi i ill in I r s s t h a n * u n d i d " II liiiiiiiill nil!! 
States x . E l l 718 F.2d 291, 293 (9 th Cir. 1983) "A wiv „ ; i i 1 t II I I II. Il I . Imiony ' 
to conform, to that of other witnesses as well as to vi, * u wr - MMenuc* w ca* »t 
that have been reveale ;:i 1: } the other witnesses." Id. At 293. Ikia, is precisely what • ^ < • ucw J I 
Ms, Pat ton ' s case. Having been present for all of Mr. MaHoy's testimony, Mr. < then 
*e*=tifi' Mr. M a ^ , u * ?1 > *krrpHit*-/ '* ^ 
e x a m i n a t i o n . 
L A L I U I in in II . j , , , , , i j , ' Ill in i III I III 111, " M l III 




 prejudice tn the H. - mt can bt 
federal rule, the Ltah Supreme Loui* 
Stale \. Carter, 776 P 2d 88f 
( Circuit stated: 
ned S.ince I 
III oas ::i; la in 
I J S • E.ll .718F.2d 
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ccWe hold that when a court fails to comply with Rule 615, prejudice is presumed 
and reversal is required unless it is manifestly clear from the record that the error was 
harmless or unless the prosecution proves harmless error by a preponderance of the 
evidence." 718 F.2d at 293-294. 
Provo City cannot now argue that it is manifestly clear from the record that the error was 
harmless. Having heard every word of Mr. Malloy's testimony, Mr. Gonzales had every 
opportunity to tailor his testimony to compensate for any shortcomings in Mr. Malloy's 
testimony. Subsequent examination of the file indicated that some of Mr. Gonzales' statements 
directly contradicted the written materials (e.g. that Gonzales, rather than Malloy, had taken the 
photographs; Appellants Brie£ page 9). Since there was no opportunity to prepare for Mr. 
Gonzales, there was no reasonable way that these contradictions could be brought to the court's 
attention on cross-examination. 
Case law on the exclusionary rule is relevant, inasmuch as Ms. Patton was in effect misled 
into waiving her rights under Rule 615. This only serves to emphasize the larger issue, however, 
that by failing to provide the witness list in discovery, the City clearly prejudiced Ms. Patton's 
defense. As set forth in the Appellant's brief (Appellant's Brie£ page 11), an error on the part of 
the prosecution puts the burden of proof on the prosecution to show that the error was harmless 
State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). This the City has failed to do. 
Mr. Gonzales' testimony clearly carried more weight than that of the other two witnesses. 
It is true that Mr. Malloy testified in vague terms as to junk, and that Mr. Keller testified that the 
Patton's home was consistent with the general character of the neighborhood. However, the 
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judges opinion (Trial transcript, pages 115-116, Appellee's brie£ page 5) makes it clear that his 
ruling was based on the finding that there was "stored trash, scraps of wood, deteriorated 
cardboard boxes", etc. in the yard. Although the court declared that it relied on the testimony of 
all three witnesses to reach this conclusion, the prosecution only cited the testimony of Mr. 
Gonzales in making its final argument regarding lumber, food, and boxes (Trial transcript, pages 
109,113). The fact that the court attributed to all three witnesses matters that were only testified 
to specifically by Mr. Gonzales clearly shows that the judge could not distinguish between the 
three, and Mr. Gonzales5 testimony was clearly prejudicial 
While the court may have relied on the testimony of Mr. Malloy and Mr. Keller to 
corroborate its finding, his specific ruling could not stand on the testimony of either of these men 
alone. Mr. Keller simply did not testify at any point that trash existed in the Patton's yard. He 
testified only that their yard was consistent with others. He testified that some of those others had 
trailers (which the court specifically did not find in the Pattons' case), some had weeds (which the 
court made no mention of in the Pattons' case), and some had piles of rocks (which nobody 
alleged existed in die Pattons' yard). He specifically stated that a neighbor had cardboard boxes, 
but only Mr. Gonzales testified as to boxes in the Pattons' yard. Nothing in Mr. Keller's 
testimony implicated the Patton's except to the extent that the court interpreted it to corroborate 
Mr. Gonzales' testimony. Had Mr. Keller's testimony been the sole testimony, there simply 
would not have been enough evidence to convict. Indeed, had the bulk of Mr. Keller's intended 
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testimony not been excluded by the court, it would have established that the City was estopped 
from charging Ms. Patton under the ordinance, as discussed further below. 
Mr. Malloy testified at length about vehicles on the property and a fence. The court did 
not find a violation as to either of those matters. As stated in Appellant's Brie£ Mr. Malloy was 
repeatedly questioned as to other items in the yard, and repeatedly replied that he "could not 
remember specifics". (Trial transcript, pages 24, 44-45, 62). He did testify as to "equipment or 
parts generally" (Trial transcript, page 51), yet the judge made no such finding in his final ruling. 
Indeed the only portions of Mr. Malloy's testimony which the court incorporated into its final 
ruling were those which corroborated Mr. Gonzales' statements. In contrast, Mr. Gonzales' 
testimony appears to have been accepted in its entirety, and it appears to form the central basis for 
the court's ruling. It is clear that the testimony of other witnesses was only relied on by the court 
to corroborate Mr. Gonzales' testimony, but there is no clear evidence that the court would have 
found the same based on their testimony alone, and the City cannot convincingly prove such from 
the record. The City has failed to meet its burden of proof as to harmless error, and the ruling of 
the trial court must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT m 
THE DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT TO RELY ON THE STANDARD OF 
ENFORCEMENT SET BY A COMPETENT COURT IN PRIOR CASES. 
The whole of the Appellee's argument with respect to the issue of a prior standard of 
enforcement is that the defendant's brief did not comply with the Rules of Procedure and 
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therefore the Court should decline to address the issues. (Under the equitable principle that those 
who seek equity must do equity, it should be noted that the Appellee's Brief in this matter was 
ffled over a month after its due date, and was accepted only by leave of the court, over the 
Appellant's ffled objection.) More importantly, however, the issue was clearly raised at trial and 
preserved for appeal, as set forth on pages 84-86 of the transcript. 
Ms. Patton attempted at several times throughout the trial to raise the issue of collateral 
estoppel, including through the testimony of Brent Keller. Every time she did so, the court 
ordered the matter excluded. See Trial transcript, pages 42, 53, 90-93, 97-98. Sentencing 
transcript, pages 12-13, 
In the trial transcript, page 56, Officer Malloy states, 
'"Because there had been previous work on it, I did browse through the existing 
file, but did not use the material in there. I went out to the site and saw an existing 
violation and proceeded with my action..." 
Mr. Malloy raised the issue himself that there had been previous action on the case, and 
that he disregarded the established file. Had Ms. Patton been permitted to present all her 
evidence, it would have clearly established that a standard of compliance had already been set in 
previous cases, and that notwithstanding Mr. Malloy's subjective determination, or even Mr. 
Gonzales' questionable testimony, she was in feet in compliance with the standard previously set 
by the court and the City in her particular case. This very issue was raised at trial (Trial 
transcript, pages 84-86) Mr. Malloy, a relatively new zoning officer, was handed an existing file 
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of previous violations and actions taken by the city, but failed to take into account the standard of 
compliance set by those previous cases. 
The elements of collateral estoppel are that: (1) The issue decided in the prior abjudication 
must be identical to the one presented in the action in question; (2) there must be a final judgment 
on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted must be a party in privity with a 
party to the prior abjudication; and (4) the issue in the first action must be completely, fully, and 
fairly litigated. Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections. 942 P.2d 933, 
938 (Utah 1997). hi 1993 Ms. Patton was also charged and convicted of having trash in her yard. 
In the Fall of 1994, at Ms. Patton's invitation, Skip Tandy of Provo City Zoning, Brent Keller and 
Stan Egan inspected the premises (Trial transcript, page 89). At that time Mr. Tandy in his 
capacity as an officer of Provo City declared that the property had improved considerably since 
trial and at that time (1994) was completely in compliance. Had he been permitted to testify, Mr. 
Keller would have attested to these facts, that he had seen the property three times since the prior 
abjudication (Trial transcript, page 88) and that it was in even better condition each time. The 
City thus set a standard of compliance, and Ms. Patton relied on that standard to her detriment in 
expending effort to improve the premises above and beyond that standard. Ms. Patton was 
entitled to present evidence to that effect to establish that the City was estopped from further 
enforcement inconsistent with the existing standard. She was prevented from doing this when the 
court excluded the relevant evidence. This was an error of law on the part of the trial court, Ms. 
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Patton was severely prejudiced thereby, and the verdict of the court should therefore be reversed. 
rv 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF A COURT-
ESTABLISHED STANDARD OF ENFORCEMENT 
Utah law is clear that enforcement of a zoning ordinance can be enjoined if there is 
discriminatory enforcement. Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136,140 (Utah 1976). In 
Kartchner the court found that wiiere there were six violations similar to those charged against the 
defendant in the same neighborhood, yet no enforcement against the other six, there was clearly 
discriminatory enforcement. "The discriminatory manner in which the ordinance has been 
enforced by plaintiff is sufficient ground to deny equitable relief" Kartchner. 552 P.2d at 140. 
Ms. Patton attempted to present considerable evidence of discriminatory enforcement by 
Provo City. The court refiised to accept exhibits to this eflFect and refused to allow Mr. Keller to 
testify as to most of these matters, and notwithstanding Mr. Keller's observations regarding 
similar violations against which the City had taken no action, the court made the erroneous 
observation that there had been no evidence presented of discriminatory enforcement (Trial 
transcript, page 97,116,119). The court erred in both excluding the relevant exhibits and the 
further testimony of Mr. Keller, and in overlooking his testimony as to discriminatory 




There can be no question that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Roger 
Gonzales. This error not only created a presumption of prejudice, but did in feet prejudice the 
defense. The City cannot establish that the error in admitting Mr. Gonzales' testimony was 
harmless, and cannot overcome the presumption of prejudice. It is also clear that City was 
estopped from enforcement of the ordinance through its previous actions, and the court clearly 
erred in excluding testimony that would have established this feet. Likewise, the court erred in 
excluding and disregarding evidence of discriminatory enforcement, a defense available to the 
Defendant under Utah law. Defendant Joan Patton's conviction of violating Provo City 
Ordinance 14.34.080 should therefore be reversed and remanded for a new triaL 
DATED this 15th day of June, 1998. 
Jjpau J. Patton v 
Appellant pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 2 copies of the attached Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed to Lisa 






here today when you're testifying, would you please 
just refer all your comments to the violation that 
exists on this lot, and violations on any other lot 
will be saved for another day? 
A. I will. 
Q. Thank you, would you please take the stand 
again. 
(Witness resumes stand) 
Now the lot at 1067 North 750 West, as whac 
you've described on the board, showing a residence and 
a parking pad, correct? 
A. It is. 
Q. In that front yard area what types of 
materials did you see on that day that you felt were a 
violation of 14-34-080? 
A. I do not recall specifics, but there were 
numerous violations on that lot. In addition to the 
trailer, that is the most obvious or most apparent 
violation when you first look at the lot. 
Q. Do you remember in general what cypes of 
materials were on that? 
A. There were lumber and other debris. He had 
things that I would see as just being trash that I 
would remove from a lot, but I do not recall the 
specifics. 
42 
part of what you said. 
Q. Would the City have any enforced its 
authority and right under the probation to bring the 
property into compliance at defendants' expense had 
she not brought it into compliance? 
A. What probation? 
Q. Any probation. As an example, this type, if 
nothing was brought into compliance, then would the 
City enforce its right to say, "Take the trailer, take 
the fence down?" 
A. I believe that that is what we have 
requested of you to either move the vehicle to another 
place on the lot or remove it from the lot to comply 
with Section 14-34-080. 
Q. But the vehicle had been removed under 
(inaudible) defendants' last guilty verdict by the 
City if the vehicle was not in compliance at that 
time? 
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, I don't have an 
objection, but I'm going to sustain it anyway. 
My objection is that we are not here to 
discuss matters of prior hearings and any rulings with 
respect to whether there was a guilty or not guilty 
verdict, as you've characterized it. Please don't get 
into those. 
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A. Should I read that? 
Q. You're welcome to. 
A. "No trash, used materials, junk, household 
furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or 
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. The 
accumulation of more than one such item constitutes a 
junk yard as defined in Chapter 14-06, Provo City 
Code, and must be removed from the property, stored 
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in 
an M-2 zone.n 
Because I have not been on the subject lot, 
I do not know what is in the backyard area. There is 
a sign, as I've described before, that prohibits me 
from going on the site to determine what is in the 
backyard. Because I have not been on the site nor 
seen what's in the backyard I cannot answer that 
adequately in response to your question. 
Q. Does the yard have trash on it? 
A. I'm sorry, what's that? 
Q. Does the yard have trash on it? 
A. As I just said, I cannot determine what's in 
the backyard area because I have not been--
Q. On what you have seen. 
A. In the front yard area I have not seen it as 
today's date. On March 19, 1996, however, there was 
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1 other materials that I referenced by sub section 3. 
2 There were materials in the yard area. 
3 Q. Does the yard have used materials in it? 
4 A. When? 
5 THE COURT: We're talking about 3/19/96? 
6 MS. PATTON: Uh-huh, that's correct. 
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, there were at that point 
8 in time materials in the front yard area. Again, I do 
9 not know what was in the backyard area. 
10 Q. BY MS. PATTON: Is the term "used material" 
11 defined in the Provo City Code? 
12 A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
13 I Q. Is the term "used material" defined in the 
14 | state code? 
15 A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
16 Q. Is the term "used material" defined in the 
17 department's policy and procedure? 
13 A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
19 Q. Does the term relate to items used in 
20 building structures? 
21 A. Does the term or does the ordinance? 
22 Q. Does the term (inaudible) the word material? 
23 A. It may well refer to materials used for 
24 construction. 
25 Q. Does the term relate to previously utilized 
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A. In some ways, yes, it is. 
Q. Does the yard have equipment or parts 
thereof on it? 
A. Equipment or parts generally? From what I 
could see in the front yard area I would say yes, 
under that general term. Again, in the backyard I 
have no idea whether or not there was those materials, 
even though the ordinance does reference any open 
area. Because of physical limitations I could not see 
what was in the backyard. 
Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in Provo 
City Code? 
Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in Utah 
State Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether objects are equipment? 
A. Whether what? 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether objects are equipment? 
A. Again, other than common sense of being able 
to identify whether an object is equipment or not, it 
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speaking about what-if's. In this specific situation 
it is not enclosed, it is an open area in the front 
yard. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether an area within a fence --
private yard is an open area? 
A. This ordinance says that the junk needs to 
be inside of a building, so anything that's not inside 
of a building would be an open area. 
Q. Has the defendant ever been charged with 
violations of Provo City Ordinances before now? 
MR. MCGINN: Objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: When you first started 
working for the zoning department approximately 17 
months ago, were you handed an open file on Joan 
Patton? 
A. I do not recall whether it was open or not. 
I was given the file, though. 
Q. Of which you have been in (inaudible) up 
through this 17 months? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you have any idea how old the fence is in 
question? 
A. The fence on the subject lot? 
56 
1 a citizen complaint? 
2 A. I had received and have received several 
3 calls from concerned residents in regards to your 
4 property. 
5 I Q. And who would those residents be? 
6 I A. I don't have that information in front of 
7 me. 
8 Q. But you do have it on file? 
9 A. That is correct. 
10 Q. Was a charge levied against this property 
11 because it had deteriorated to a level that existed at 
12 the time prior to the charge? 
13 A. I cannot really answer that. When I started 
14 with the City I was given numerous cases and asked to 
15 investigate those, and one such case was your 
16 property. Because there had been previous work on it 
17 I did browse through the existing file, but did not 
18 use the material in there. I went out to the site and 
19 saw an existing violation and proceeded with my action 
20 as of that date in contacting you and requesting that 
21 the property be brought into compliance. 
22 MS. PATTON: I have no more questions for 
23 the witness at this time, your Honor, but would like 
24 to reserve the right to inquire the witness further. 
25 THE COURT: You may. 
62 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCGINN: 
Q. Officer Malloy, forget about the trailer, 
forget about the trailer right now on this piece of 
property that we're talking about. Forget it's not 
there. On that day we're there, on March 19, 1996, 
was there scrap material, junk, garbage, trash in the 
front yard area constituting a violation? 
A. There were. 
Q. Is it possible that two different zoning 
officers could ever at one time go out to a piece of 
property and one officer miss a violation? 
A. I would say that would be unlikely, but it 
could happen. 
MR. MCGINN: No further questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
May I see the exhibits, please? Do you have 
them right there? Thank you. 
Call your next witness, will you, please? 
MR. MCGINN: Mr. Roger Gonzalez. 
THE COURT: Before Mr. Gonzalez testifies, 
Mr. Schriner and Mr. Means? 
Ms. Patton, is there a problem? 
MS. PATTON: Yes, I object, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Object to what? 
63 
MS. PATT0N: I asked him discovery who the 
witnesses would be, and Mr. Malloy said that they had 
no witnesses, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, let me address--
MS. PATTON: Mr. McGinn, pardon me. 
THE COURT: Let me address that in a minute. 
Why don't you have a seat. 
Before we call the next witness, the case 
that was on before you folks has been resolved for 
some time. I want: to dispose of it now so that these 
folks can go on their way. 
(Short recess taken) 
THE COURT: Thank you, folks,,, for the 
interruption. 
Now Mr. McGinn, you were calling another 
witness? 
MR. MCGINN: Yes, your Honor, Roger 
Gonzalez, and I believe they were objecting. 
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, you had an 
objection. State your objection, will you, please? 
MS. PATTON: I did not receive any discovery 
that Mr. Gonzalez was going to be a witness, therefore 
I have not had a chance to prepare. 
THE COURT: 1 didn't soe any scheduling 
order that said identification of witnesses. 
64 
Mr. McGinn? 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, if I could respond 
to that. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MCGINN: Joan Pat ton has come into 
office several times. Our office has an open file 
policy. I believe Mr. Humiston, I believe also, has 
come in and asked for discovery. In our office if --
and to show them, in our file -- if they come in we'll 
allow them to look at the file, or we just make copies 
of everything that's in the file. We give everybody 
everything, there should be no secrets, that's our 
office policy and that's what we do. 
With that, I know as Joan Patton has come in 
several times, we do have a cover sheet. It has a 
list of our officers that says, "Anthony Malloy, Roger 
Gonzalez from the zoning department." Anytime they 
come in and take a look that's there, and those are 
the orders that we give for them for people who--
THE COURT: When did the defendants first 
become aware of the name of Roger Gonzalez associated 
in this charge? 
MS. PATTON: Just now, your Honor. 
MR. HUMISTON: Your Honor, every document in 
this file was provided to me in discovery except the 
one that Mr. McGinn is referring to. This is the 
first we've heard about Mr. Gonzalez. 
I appreciate they do have an open file 
policy and (inaudible) very generous, but this issue 
has come up and we also find out for the first time 
that there were neighbor complaints, which issue was 
specifically addressed at the time of pre-trial. So 
I'm getting the impression that the open file policy 
has been less than entirely open. 
MR. MCGINN: They've had access to 
everything I have and more. Joan's called me and 
asked me for -- or Ms. Patton has called me and asked 
me for files that community development's had that 
I've not had in my possession, given those files to 
her, she's been free to go through it. 
THE COURT WPII, there's nothing contained 
in the files with respect to identification of 
witnesses on either side -- objection to witnesses 
identification or objection to exhibits That means 
everything's been done informally. 
MS. PATTON: Can I be heard, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. PATTON: The motion for the bill of 
particulars, which we've had a hearing on, I did 
specifically at that time ask for a witness list and 
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have not to this date been given a witness list, your 
Honor, and I do not dispute what Mr. Malloy has 
said -- or Mr. McGinn, I'm sorry. 
I did in fact see everything that was in 
that file except for the top page that I have just now 
seen. 
MR. MCGINN: If I may approach just to show 
the Court--
THE COURT: Just a moment. Would you point 
out for me, please, where in your bill of particulars 
you ask for identification of witnesses? 
MS. PATTON: I did it verbally, your Honor, 
before Judge Howard, in which I don't have a 
transcript. 
THE COURT: I have your bill of particulars 
and I have your memorandum in support of your bill of 
particulars, and there is nothing by way of any 
request for witnesses. I'm going to deny your 
objection. 
Mr. Gonzalez? 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
MR. HUMISTON: I do understand that, your 
Honor. However, based on that a lot of the -- our 
preparations is based on what the source of the 
information were, and representations made by Mr. 
Malloy himself there were in fact no such witnesses. 
Had we had that information --we <iioii't know, because 
it was not provided to us. It could have made a 
difference --a substantial difference in how our 
defense would have been prepared, what lesses we 
might have brought. 
Again, 's speculation at this point 
because we don't have that information, but: we do teel 
it was very relevant. 
THE COURT: How would your defense be 
different if there's not going to be any testimony 
from neighbor witnesses? If there's not going to be 
any and we're not treat, inq any evidence from anyone, 
then there's nothing to address. 
MR. HUMISTON: One of the issues that has 
been of great concern to us has been the fact that 
there is an open file being maintained on Mrs. Patton, 
that chis is been in court now -- this is the fourth 
prosecution that's been brought against her, and that 
some of the issues being raised in this were issues 
that could have been raised in the previous 
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prosecution. 
A lot of what's relevant to that is who is 
initiating these, where is it coming from? Our 
information up 'til today was that in fact the City, 
on its on initiative, had initiated these things 
without any complaints from neighbors, without any 
input whatsoever. 
From our position it would change the 
posture of the case a great deal had we known that 
there were in fact neighbors involved, if there were 
in fact neighbors involved. We're a little confused 
now because Mr. Malloy has represented just the 
opposite to us earlier. 
THE COURT: The City's case will rise or 
fall depending upon the testimony of Anthony Malloy 
and Roger Gonzalez. So I'll deny your motion with 
respect to issues concerning phantom neighbors. They 
have no impact with me here. 
MR. HUMISTON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Do you want to make an opening 
statement, Mr. Humiston? Do you want to do it before 
Ms. Patton does her case or after her? 
MS. PATTON: I just have one more thing and 
then I'm done. 


























make a brief statement, and I've already alluded to 
this, is that -- this is, for the Court's information, 
the fourth prosecution that has been brought against 
Mrs. Patton. We feel that there are serious issues 
of, if nothing else, estoppel. We're talking about a 
fence --of course, the fence charge has been dropped, 
but we feel that, there's some other element here 
involved, and (inaudible) simply violations, and we'd 
like to -- we'll present that (inaudible) argument as 
far as 
you, pi 
what's been going on here. 
















Patton proceed with her case. 
Okay. Thank you, sir. 
call your first witness, will 
Defense calls Brent Keller. 
Mr Keller? 
You do solemnly sv/ear that the 
are about to give in this case now 
before the Court wi 11 t e the tr utl i, the whole 
and nothing but 
THE WITNESS: 
. the truth, so help you God? 
I do. 
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1 THE COURT: What's the date in 1994? 
2 MS. PATTON: It was one week after my 
3 sentencing with the Court. 
4 THE COURT: I don't know anything about 
5 sentencing. 
6 MS. PATTON: I'm sorry. And here again, 
7 I your Honor--
8 THE COURT: What's the date in 1994? 
9 MR. HUMISTON: Could I speak to the 
10 relevance of this, your Honor? 
11 THE COURT: No, I would like to know the 
12 date, please. 
13 MS. PATTON: (inaudible) one moment. 
14 THE COURT: While she is looking for that, 
15 Mr. Humiston, I'd be happy to hear from you to respond 
16 to the objection. 
17 MR. HUMISTON: Yes, as far as the objection, 
18 one of the arguments -- and I speak (inaudible) I have 
19 not talked to her as far as (inaudible) but one of the 
20 arguments I'm (inaudible) is there is an issue of 
21 estoppel here in that some of -- the City has, as I 
22 said, prosecuted her three times in the past. The 
23 J issues being raised today have not been raised in the 
24 past, and some of these pertain to violations that 
25 allegedly --if they are violations today -- may have 
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been violations at that time. The r did not, at 
that time, take any action. r believe Mr. Keller's 
testimony will go to that issue. 
Also there is some testimony as tin the 
(inaudible) zoning official's approval that the house 
was in compliance prior to the prosecution and that in 
fact nothing has changed. 
Also (inaudible) issue of estoppel, as well 
as other issues. So I believe that's where the 
relevancy of Mr. Keller's testimony is to prior issues 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Mr. McGinn? 
MS. PATTON: Give or take a few days, your 
Honor, it would have been the week of December 22nd. 
MR. MCGINN: Well, several things. If he's 
going to testify as to the condition of the property 
as it was in 1994, and that it looked the same now in 
1996, I have no problem with that. Bi :f he's going 
to testify that Skip Tandy, a zoning officer, said, 
"Oh, this property looks great, it's fine," and it's 
in the same condition, I'm goi i ig to object to that for 
hearsay. 
That's an out of court statement offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted that the 
property looked the same and was fine, and therefore 
if there's some of estoppel going on here for the 
City, we can easily file a -- have Skip Tandy brought 
into court as a rebuttal witness, and we can have him 
testify to everything he did in 1994 and to what the 
property looks like, and if he's seen it now, and a 
violation. 
I think what they want to get it is this 
witness saying that a Provo City zoning officer said 
it was okay, and I think that's hearsay. 
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, do you v/ant to speak 
to that? 
MS. PATTON: I'll rephrase the question. 
THE COURT: No, no, no. I haven't ruled on 
the objection yet. Do you want to speak to his 
response? 
Mr. Humiston, do you want to speak to it? 
MR. HUMISTON: Your Honor, if the State 
would like to bring in Skip Tandy, and he would 
testify to these matters, we would certainly have no 
objection to that, although I'm not sure how that puts 
us for time today. 
THE COURT: It doesn't put us very good for 
today. 
I'm going to grant the objection with 
respect to testimony as to the condition of the 
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property in December of 1994. The question is whether 
or not the property was In violation on March 19, 
1996. 
MR. HUMIST0N: May I approach? 
THE COURT: Y\>u bet , you sure may. 
BY MS. PATT0N: I would like to ask what the 
condition of the properties in the neighborhood that 
the defendant resides in, as you would have possibly-
seen this morning? 
A The neighborhood — quite frankly, it's not 
a neighborhood I would like to live in. There are 
numerous trailers with junk in them, there are yards 
with piles of lO'.'/ks and debris. One house in 
particular stands out as I went through the 
neighborhood last Friday and again today, there's a 
carport full of cardboard boxes clear up to the 
ceiling. I couldn't even -- I imagine there were many 
dozens of these cardboard boxes, which is about four 
houses down from the Patton residence. 
A house not too far away, a log house, the 
front yard is full of weeds. Many houses in the area 
are very similar. It's an older neighborhood, the 
houses aren't well kept, the yards aren't well kept, 
they are not immaculate yards that I see in many of 
the other parts of Provo. That's how I'd describe the 
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talking about any trailer on the street. We're 
talking about perhaps an inoperable vehicle in the 
front yard, or -- and/or we're talking about garbage, 
trash, junk, those types of materials in the front 
yard. That's what we're here about, we're not here 
about trailers in the streets, whether people have 
things parked--
MR. HUMISTON: Maybe we're arguing semantics 
here, but by on the street I mean other neighbors on 
the street, there are trailers in driveways, trailers 
in yards, junk in front of houses. We have evidence 
of all of that, and we are curious as to why the 
Pattons are being singled out when I think evidence 
would show, relative to some of these other houses, 
it's actually quite a bit cleaner. 
MR. MCGINN: My contention is that there has 
been no showing of any evidence anywhere that the 
Pattons have been singled out. In cross examination I 
thought Officer Malloy said yes, there are other 
violations in the area that they're working on. 
THE COURT: I don't have any evidence of 
discriminatory enforcement of the Provo City 
Ordinances. The fact that we may have a junky 
neighborhood and that the defendant's property 
complies with the junky neighborhood, making it junky, 
too, doesn't tell me that that's discriminatory 
enforcement of the ordinance as to the defendants. 
So we've got the testimony from this 
gentleman concerning what he's observed in the 
neighborhood, and that the defendants' property looks 
about the same as everybody else. I don't think we 
need anything else with respect to neighborhood 
description. 
Count I sets forth the claimed violations of 
the defendants with respect to 14-34-080, and that's 
what we're -- we are going to proceed under that or 
we're not in terms of any finding of violation or no 
violation. 
MR. HUMISTON: So are you sustaining the--
THE COURT: I'm sustaining the objection to 
the marking of photographs as exhibits to support the 
witness' testimony as to what the neighborhood looked 
like. That's what you wanted to do with them, that's 
what she said. 
MR. HUMISTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Pat ton, are you through 
with this gentleman? 
MS. PATTONi T h&ve no further questions for 
the witness as this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MCGINN: They testified that from that 
photo you can't see clearly the interior of the yard, 
but Mr. Gonzalez was clear in that he stood on the 
sidewalk, looked in the yard, and described the types 
of materials; lumber that was in various bits and 
pieces, food upon the ground that were not covered, 
there was some questions alluding to the fact that 
this could have been firewood, but it was not kept --
there is no evidence that it was kept in any sort of 
manner, there is no evidence that it was used as 
firewood. There was boxes, bags strewn across the 
front yard. 
They are clearly in violation. When there's 
a violation that needs to be addressed. If the 
property gets cleaned up and in five months there's 
another violation, that violation needs to be 
addressed. 
We think the evidence that has been 
presented to the Court is clear. There's only been 
three witnesses, both Officers Malloy and Gonzalez 
testified that the yard in question did have junk, 
garbage, material, trash. 
Mr. Keller for the defense testified --he 
testified, that the whole neighborhood --he testified 
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this was something he had only found out last week. 
So I would submit that as far as the count 
that remains, the State has failed to establish a 
prima facia case of a violation, and we would rest on 
that. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
MR. MCGINN: Thank you, your Honor. 
Subjective to termination, your Honor, terms and 
ordinances have their plain and ordinary meaning, and 
I understand that some people may consider one man's 
garbage is another man's treasure. But in this case 
the evidence was clear there were wood strewn about 
the lawn with -- uncovered that had been weathered, 
there were paper or cartons -- cardboard cartons thac 
were overflowing, splitting, had been left out in the 
weather, were in a weathered condition. 
I think this clearly under the plain and 
ordinary words used in the ordinance, 14-34-080, are 
trash, junk, materials that are clearly in the area. 
As far as any intent, the officer indicated 
that he sent a letter indicating that there was a 
violation, the letter came back from Ms. Patton 
indicating that she didn't think there was a 
violation. 
As to the meaning of the vehicle, whether 
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All those photographs really show is a 
residence with a bunch of material out in front and a 
parked trailer. 
Mr. Malloy testified that he didn't remember 
if the trailer had flat tires on it on March 19th or 
not, and he said he had no evidence of whether the 
trailer was registered or whether it wasn't. 
The second portion of the City's charging 
offense contained in Count I is the defendant, also 
during the time in question, stored trash, used 
materials, junk, household furniture, appliances, 
scrap materials, equipment or parts thereof in an open 
area not screened from the public streets and adjacent 
properties by an opaque wall or fence. 
In reading the statute and hearing the 
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy and Mr. 
Gonzalez, which is the testimony we have, and the 
testimony of Mr. Keller that we had a rather 
dilapidated neighborhood in which the defendants' 
property complied in making it appear to be the same 
as the neighborhood in question, I find that the City 
has met its burden of proof concerning the second 
portion of that charging information in Count I, 
therefore I find the defendants guilty as charged. 
From the plain and simple meaning of the 
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ordinance, so you have your record on appeal, folks, I 
believe that the evidence has sufficiently 
demonstrated that there are items which consist of 
junk, stored trash, scraps of wood, deteriorated 
cardboard boxes, and even potential food products that 
looked like they had gone bad, from the witness' 
testimony. 
And with that testimony being the only 
testimony on the record, with nothing else to rebut it 
or to describe what it was, then the Court has only 
one conclusion to draw, and that is is it believable 
or is it not, and I find that the City has met its 
proof with respect to belief. 
The questions that came from the defendant, 
Mrs. Patton, was it possible for these things to be 
something else. I guess it's possible that Haley Bob 
comet had a spaceship behind it. Probable? Probably 
not. It's possible that all of these things were 
meant for the burning of firewood? Possible. But 
from the testimony I have on the record, and I have to 
make a finding from the testimony, it's probable that 
it was not firewood. So I find the defendants guilty 
as charged in Count I. 
What's your pleasure with respect to 
sentencing? You may be sentenced today on each of 
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will be bringing charges in the future because they 
are not in compliance. 
I think it would just be a help to them at 
that time -- we're all going to be here anyways, we 
can present them with what we think we have, and if we 
can't get compliance, the City is going to be forced 
to bring charges again against them. 
THE COURT: Well, the City can do whatever 
it feels it needs to do in terms of the property other 
than 1067 North 750 West. My only concern is whether 
or not --or what sentence will be imposed with 
respect to that property and that property only. 
MR. MCGINN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: My objective in reviewing this 
at the time of sentencing is to hear from both sides, 
and I'll tell you, the language is clear with respect 
to zoning, and the preferences to bring property into 
compliance is found to be out. 
If there is attempt to be made in the 
sentencing of this case when we have the sentencing, 
it will pertain to 1067 North 750 West, and I'm not 
going to come in here and talk at the next date about 
what's across the grass on the property on the other 
side, because it has nothing to do with this case now 
and we haven't heard any testimony on it. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Patton, I'd be happy to hear from you 
first. 
MS. PATTON: In pre-trial conference, your 
Honor, I had an opportunity to tell Mr. McGinn in 
detail my feelings for why this has been (inaudible) 
now I would like to tell you that I'm (inaudible). 
The first case was actually -- just one 
second, your Honor. 
MR. HUMISTON: 1987. 
THE COURT: Maybe I can help, and you, Mr. 
Humiston, on behalf of Mr. Patton. Those other cases 
really don't have much of an impact on me. I've got a 
case where my ruling was that they were guilty with 
respect to Count I, and my question to you folks is, 
what's going to be done to comply? 
The fact that there was compliance or there 
wasn't compliance with regard to other cases that were 
handled by other judges is old news. I'm really not 
interested in rehashing all that stuff. It doesn't 
make any difference to me anymore. You've all gone 
through it, the City has gone through it, you folks 
have gone through it, either complied or you didn't 
comply. 
Now we're starting over, and you're starting 
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with this case with me. My question to you is, what 
do you have to say, if anything, with respect to the 
sentencing on this case and the City's recommendation 
as they've made it? 
I don't want to talk about old cases, okay? 
Now that should shorten things considerably. 
MS. PATTON: Can I put my objection in? 
THE COURT: Objection to what? 
MS. PATTON: I wanted to bring up my 
mistrust for Provo City, and that was what I--
THE COURT: I'll tell you what, I think that 
I've sensed that from the opening get-go of our trial 
of your mistrust for Provo City, so you don't need to 
tell me about it anymore. I know that you don't trust 
Provo City, but the fact is that there has been a 
finding of guilt responsibility with respect to Count 
I, and that's what I want to address now. 
I have these other people sitting in the 
back that are also entitled to have their day and to 
resolve cases. I'm not willing to compromise your 
time for theirs, nor am I willing to compromise theirs 
for yours. 
I want to give everybody a fair opportunity 
to be heard on all of their cases, but I would like 
you to address your focus on this case and why we're 
